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Petr contends that the DC Superior Court lacked jurisdiction
\-

~

to try his prosecution for a felony under the DC code. PetrJ~rguement
starts with the fact that the judges of that court by statute have
ii~

limited tenure and not protection against reductions in salary,

and that the

t~a

Superior Court is a iaf legislative court established

under Article I of the constitution. The key contention , however, is
that only a court established under Article III can be given jurisdiction to try a felony prosecution under an act of Congress which per•
tains HE exclusively to tne DC.
(Justice Rms Powell: I have included the relevant constitutional
provismons for your reference on the last page.).

-

This contention is without merit. In a variety of instances
Congress has

~i

held that legislative courts may be vested with

judicial power, Williams v. United States, 289

',

u.s.

~HBiEi

553. For exampl,,

state courts lacking Article III protections of un,l imited tenure
frequently BBix decide the federal rights and obligations of

lit ~

igants-- subject always to lila with ilsui li?IS rr:rrts to review up hereo
The real issue in this case is whether the DC §up. Ct. was

-

properly within the Article I powers of Congress to "exercise exclusive Legislation in all cases whatsoever in the Dist. of Col." and
to "make

all laws which

a~

s~ a~

shall be necessary and proper to

carry into execution the foregoing powers." This

isss~ax

issue has

been decided against petr in National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tieewater
Transfer Co.337 U.S.582 where the Court said that Congress may
confer judicial power upon the courts of the District of Col. in
the exercise of its Article I powers over the Districto As a
practical matter, the Court of General Sessmons has historically
exercised
of

~-~i

~~

jurisdiction over

acts made misdemeanors by act

a£~

Congress.

Petr's reliance on O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 US 516 is
misleading for the Court never suggested in ~ that case tha~ongress
lacked power to establish

axsm~zt ~

an Article I court system for

the District of Col.
Axxax~zasti£

confers

on~

As I read Article I, the broad language of it

Congress total legislative authority over the District,

should it EMBBB choose to use ito

x Such

failt to include the power to establish a
DE NY

sweeping authority cannot
s~stem

of courts.

JHW

P.s.--Petr brings up several search and seizure claims which appear
without merit.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Art. I, § 8 provides, in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have the Power * * * T~
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles
square) as may, by Cession of particular States,
and the Acceptance of Congress, become th.~ ~e~t J
of the Government of the United States ~
And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers * * *.
Art. III provides, in pertinent part:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United
States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges,

both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services,
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority ;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls ;-to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;
-to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two
or more States;-between a State and Citizens of
another State ;-between Citizens of different
States ;-between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

In due course I will circulate an
opinion in dissent from Byron's in
Palmore v. United States.

The Conference

.'

72~11,

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Doug la~
Mr. Jus t~.ce Brennan
Mr., J ustl ce Stev;art
Mr . JustJ ce J,~arsh all
Mr . Justice Dlackmun
;;ii:Justice Powoll
Mr . JuGtice Rehn•JUi st
From: White, J.

1st DRAFT

Circulated:___!d_-

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Recirculated:

No. 72- 11
Roosevelt F. Palmore,
On Appeal from the District of
Appellant,
Columbia Court of Appeals.
v.
United States.
[April - , 1973]

MR. J u sTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Aside from an initial question of our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), this case requires us
to decide whe ther a defendant charged with a felony
under the District of Columbia Code may be tried by a
judge who does not have protection with respect to tenure
under Art. III of the Constitution. We hold that a defend ant charged with violating a local District of Columbia criminal law has no more federal constitutional
r~~l the_ citizen~ St ate, when charged with
be tried by a judge with lifeviolation of a state law, to..._____......__
.,
time te nure; and that under its Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, power
t~ate for the District of Columbia, Congress may
provide for such trials before judges who, in accordance
with the District of Columbia Code are not provided with
life tenure.
'

-

I

The facts are uncomplicated. In January 1971, two
officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department observed a moving automobile with license
tags suggesting that it was a rented vehicle. Although
no traffic or other violation was then indicated, the officer stopped the vehicle for a spot-check of the driver's
license and car-rental agreement. Palmore, the driver of

'-f -7 ~
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the vehicle, produced a rental agreement from the glove
compartment of the car and explained why the car appeared to be, but was not, overdue. During this time,
one of the officers observed the hammer mechanism of a
gun protruding from under the arnH"est in the front seat
of the vehicle. Palmore was arrested and later charged
with the felony of carrying an unregistered pistol in the
District of Columbia after having been convicted of a
felony, all in violation of the District of Columbia Code,
~ 22-3204 (1967). 1 He was tried and found guilty in
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Under Title I of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1070, 84 Stat. 473
et seq. (Reorganization Act),~ the judges of the superior
1
The section proYided:
"No por,;on shall within tho District of Cohunbia r:Hr~· ci1iwr
open!~ · or comcalrcl on or about hi,; por~on, (•xecpt in hi.' dwelling
hou~r or place of bu~inr~~ or on other Lu:d po.-~o~~ed h.1· him, a
pi,;tol, \\'ithout a liccn~e therefor i~~nrcl a~ herein:tftrr Jlrovided, or
any dead!~· or dangerou~ wenpon (·apablr of bring ~o concealed.
Whoe1·er 1·iol:ttc,; this Rec1ion shall be puni.-<hccl ns pro1·ided in section
22-3215, unles;:; the violation occurs after he h:ts hccn com·ictcd
in the District of Col11mbia of a violation of this ~crtion or of a
fdony, either in the Di"trict of Columbia or in another juri~dirtion,
in which case he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more
1ktn ten years."
~Before passage of the Di~tril't of Columbia Court Hrform and
Criminal Procedme Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 473 et seq. (Tieorg:tnization
Act), the local court s~·;,;tom con~i~ted of one appellate court and
three trial courts, two of which, the juvenile comt and the tax court,
wrre courts of ~pecial jurisdiction. Thr third tri:tl colll't, tbr Di~1rict of Columbia Court of General se~sion~. WflH Oil(' of qnitr limited jmi~diction, its criminal juri,t!irtion consi~ting Rolely of that
exercised ronrurrentl~' with the Fnitrcl Strtte" Di~t rict Court over
mi.-<demonnors and pett~· offen~e~. D. C. Code§ 11-903 (1907). Thr
court's civil jurisdiction was restricted to rnse~ wherr the nmount
in rontro,·ers~r did not excrrcl $10,000, nncl it had jurisdiction over
cnses involving title to rcnl proJWrt~- only \\·hen it was part. of a
cli1·orce nction. !d., nt §§ 11-961 and 11-1141. The judgments of
the appellate court, tho District of Columbia Court of Appeal~,

72-11-0PINION
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court arc appointed by the President and serve for terms
of 13 years. D. C. Code, §§ 11-1501 (a), 11-1502.':
Palmore moved to dismiss the indictment against him,
were ~ubjC'ct to rC'1·irw h.1· thr Unitrd Stntrs Court of .\ppC'nl~ fo1·
thr Distrirt of Columbia. ld., nt 11-:321.
Thr {!nitre! 8t:1te~ Di~trirt Court for thr Distrirt had conrurrrnt
jmi~diction "·ith thr Court of Grnrrnl Sr~.-;ion~ o1·rr mo~t of the
criminal nnd civil mnltrrs h:lndkd b~· 1l1:lt court, id., nt §§ 11-521,
11-.'522, :mel 11-52:~, nnd hncl exdu~iw .i mi~clict ion o1·rr frluny offrnses, r1·rn though committed in viola! ion of locally npplicnblr lnws,
id., nt § 11-521. Thu~ til<' Di~t rirt Court "·n~ fillin~ 1he roiC' of
hoth a lorn! nne! frclrrnl court.
8erking to improve thr prrfonnancr of thC' court .<~·strm, Congrr~s. in Title I of thr Hcorgnnizntion Art, im·estrd thr lorn! courts
with .iuri~cliction rqui1·nlrnt to thnt rxrreisrcl by st[ltr court~. S. Hrp.
~o. 91-405, sup1'a. [lt 2-3; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, su7n·a, nt 23-24.
Thr thrrr formrr tri:1l courts "·ere combinrcl into t hr nr"· Suprrior
Court of the Distriet of Columbia, D. C. Code§ 11-901. which wns
w~trd with minor rxcrptions with rxrlusiYc .iurisclietion o\"Cr nll
crimin[l] cnses, including fdonies. brou.ght under lnws :1pplie:1hle
ex!·lu~ii'('!Y to thr District, id .. at § 11-923 (b). Its civil juri~diction
rrnrhrd [111 civil nctions :1nd nn~· othrr m[lttC'r at lnw or in equit~·.
hron.u:ht in the Di~trict of Columbin, C'Xcrpt thosC' in whirh e-xrlusi\'C
.imi~dirtion wns vc~trcl in the United States District Court. lrl.. [lt
~ 11-921. The lorn! np])(':l]s ronrt. the Dist riet of Columhin Comt
of Appr[l]s. would ultim[ltclv not be sub.iert to re1·iew b~· ihr
lnited Rtntrs Comt of Ap]1e[l]s, id .. nt § 11-301. and was derbrrd to
hr thr "highe~t court of the District of Columbia" for purpn:::rs of
further rrview bv this Court. !d .. [lt § 11-102.
Tn :1dclition to thr shift in juri~dirtion, thr numbrr of !oral judges
"·a~ inrrrn~ed, their trnure wns lengthened from 10 to 15 ~·e[lr~. :1nd
t hrir f'[l\nriC's were incrensrd and fixrd [lt a pC'rrent[lge of tk1t of
.iudgrs of the Unitrd States courts. !d., nt §§ 11-703. 11-003,
11-904, [llld 11-1502. The Reorgnnization Act C'f'tnhliRhed a Commi-<sion on Judici[l] Dis:1bilities [lllcl TC'nnre to den] with ~<uspen~ion,
ret irrmrnt. or removnl of loc:1l jndgrs, id., at § 1521, et seq. It
nl~o pr01·iclrd for improwd [lclministration of thr lor:1l courtR, irl.,
nt § 11-1701, et seq .. inrlnding [luthorization for nn ExPcutive
Offirrr rri'ponsiblc for the ndministration of the local comt s~·stem.
ld .. nt § 11-1703.
~The 15-~·mr term is subject to the ]1rovi8ion for m[lm\[ltor.\' rrtirrmrnt [lt [lge 70. D. C. Code § 11-1502.

72-11-0PI~ION
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urging that only a judge S('rving "during good behavior"
as specified by Art. III of th(' United States Constitution
could constitutionally preside over a felony proE:ecution
under the District of Columbia Code. He also moved to
suppress the pistol as the fruit of an illegal search and
seizure. The motions were denied in the superior court
and Palmore was convicted.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed, concluding that under the plenary power to legislate for the District of Columbia conferred by Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution, Congress had "constitutional power to proscribe certain criminal conduct only
in the District and to select the appropriate court,
whether it is created by virtue of article III or article I,
to hear and determine these particular criminal cases
within the District." 290 A. 2d 573, 576- 577 (1972).
Appellant filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals and his jurisdictional statement here, purporting
to perfect an appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). We
postponed further consideration of our jurisdiction to review this case by way of appeal to the hearing on the
merits. 409 U. S. 840 (1972).
II
28 U. S. C. § 1257" specifies the circumstances under
which the final judgments of the highest court of a
State may be reviewed in this Court by way of appeal or
4
28 U. S. C. § 1257 provides:
"Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highrst court of
a State in which a deci ion could be had, may be reYir\Ycd by the
Supreme Court as follows:
'· (1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a
trraty or statute of the United States and the decision is again~t its
validity.
"(2) By appeal, where ir:; drawn in qurr:;tion the valiclily of a
;.:tatute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the

72-11-0PINION
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writ of certiorari. As amended in 1970 by§ 172 (a)(1)
of the Reorganization Act. 84 Stat. 590, the term "highest court of a State" as used in § 1257 includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Appeal lies only
'vhere a statute of the United States is stricken down,
28 U. S. C. § 1257 ( 1), or where a statute of a State is
sustained against federal constitutional attack, id., at
§ 1257 (2). Because the statute at issue was upheld in
this case, an appeal to this Court from that judgment
lies only if the statute 'vas a "statute of any State"
within the meaning of § 1257 (2). Palmore insists that
it is, but we cannot agree.
The 1970 amendent to § 1257 plainly provided that
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals should be·
treated as the "highest court of a State," but nowhere
in § 1257, or elsevvhere, has Congress provided that the
words "statute of any State," as used in § 1257 (2), are
to include the provisions of the District of Columbia
Code. A reference to "state statutes" would ordinarily
not include provisions of the District of Columbia Code,
which was not enacted by a state legislature but by Congress, and which applies only within the boundaries of
the District of Columb.ia. The District of Columbia is
constitutionally distinct from the States, Hepburn v.
Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445 (1805), cf. Mutual Insurance Co.
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the deci~ion
is in favor of its validity.
"(3) By writ of certiorai, where the validity of a treaty or statute
of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of
a State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
or where any title, right, priYilege or immunity is ~pecinlly t:et up
or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commi~~ion held or authority exercised under, the United State8.
"For the purposes of this t:ection, the term 'highest court of a
State' includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals."

72-11-0PINION
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v. Tidewater Co., 337 U. S. 582 (1949). Nor does it
follow from the decision to treat the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals as a state court that the District Code
was to be considered a state statute for the purposes of
§ 1257. We are entitled to assume that in ainending
§ 1257, Congress legislated with care and that had Congress intended to equate the District Code and state
statutes for the purposes of § 1257, it would have said
so expressly and not left the matter to mere implication."
Jurisdictional statutes are to be construed "with precision and with fidelity to the terms by which Congress
has expressed its wishes," Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 392 U. S. 206. 212
(19G8), and we are particularly prone to accord "strict
construction of statutes authorizing appeals" to this
Court. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41, n. 1,
at 42 (1970). We •vill not, therefore, hold that Congress intended to treat the District of Columbia Code as
a state statute for the purposes of § 1257 (2).
Palmore relies on Balzac "i'. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298
( 1922), where an enactment of the territorial legislature
of Puerto Rico \Vas held to be a statute of a State within
the meaning of the then applicable statutory provisions
,; An exprro.-; proYi~ion would hnYc heen n simple thing. a.-; demonr.1ted by specific provisions in i he United State~ Cod<' runcrrning
ilw Di ..;;trict of Columbia. Cf. 28 U. S. C. § 1:~0:~, nddecl to thr
United Sbte::; Code by § 172 (a) (2) (A) of the Jloorganizaiion Act,
84 Stai. 590, IYhrro for purposes of r. 85 drnling with the juri~dic
tion of the Unitrd Stairs Di~trirt Comt~, il i~ proYiclrd thnt
"references to b1Ys of the United Stntr::; or Ario of Con,gre ...;s do not
include law::; npplirnblr oxdusivr l ~· to thr Di~trict of Coluntbin."
See also the irentmrnt of thr Di~trirt ol' Colu mbia :1~ a '·Stnte" for
Jlltrpo~o~ of di1·or"it~· jmisdiction, 2S U. S. C. § 1::\:32 (d). nnd the
rquall~· discrete JH'ol·i~ion of 28 U. S. C. § 1451. aclded to thr Coclr
by § 172 (d) (1) of tho Reorgnlli7,Cttion Art, 84 Stat. 591, which
providrs t hnt for purpo~es of the removal provi~ion~ t be Suprrior
Court of the Di~trict of Columbia is io be ron~idrred n "St~ltr court"
:1nd the Di~trict of Columbia deemed to be :1 "StatP."
~~
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governing appeals to this Court. That result has been
codified in 28 U. S. C. § 1258; but even so, the Balzac
rationale was severely undermined in Fornaris where '"e
hold that a statute passed by the legislature of Puerto
Riro is not "a state statuto" within the meaning of 28
U. S. C. § 1254 (2), and that it should not be treated as
such in the absence of more definitive guidance from
Congress.
We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction of the
appeal filed in this case. Palmore presents federal constitutional issues, however, that are reviewable by writ
of certiorari under § 1257 (3); and treating tho jurisdictional statement as a petition for 'nit of certiorari, ~ e..f.
y rcquiFecl by 28 U. S. C. § 2103, we grant the petition
limited to the question of whether Palmore was entitled
to be tried by a court ordained and established in accm·dance with Art. III, § 1, of tho Constitution.'' It is
to this issue that we now turn.
III
Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of tho Constitution provides that
Congress shall have power "to exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" over the District of
Columbia. The power is plenary. Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be
applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may
also exorcise all the police and regulatory powers which
a state legislature or municipal government would havO'
"I3rcau:-<e we postponed the que~tion of om juri~dirtion o1·rr t hi~
[lppral to con~ideration of the merits, rather than enterin~ an unrrHtrictrd notation of probable jurisdiction, there is no b~t><i>< for
infrrrin~. from our findin~ thi" appeal impro]1N, that our initial
ordrr mu~t Ilel·erthele~., be taken ns havin~ grantrd rrrtiorari.
Hrmr, om denbl of the writ with rrspcrl to the Fourth Amendmrnl rbim, rat her than a di~missaJ a~ improYidently grant rd. CL
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 512-513 (1966).
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in legislating for state or local purposes. Congress "may
exercise within the District all legislative powers that
the legislature of a state might exercise within the state;
and may vest and distribute the judicial authority in and
among courts and magistrates and regulate judicial proceedings before them, as it may think fit, so long as it
does not contravene any provision of the Constitution
of the United States." Capital Traction Co. v. H of, 174
U. S. 1, 5 ( 1899). This has been the characteristic view
in this Court of congressional powers with respect to the
District. 7 It is apparent that the power of Congress
under Clause 17 permits it to legislate for the District
in a manner with respect to subjects that ·would exceed
its powers, or at least would be very unusual, in the context of national legislation enacted under other powers
delegated to it under Art. I, § 8. See Gibbons v. District
of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404, 408 (1886).
Pursuant to its Clause 17 authority, Congress has from
time to time enacted laws that comprise the District of
Columbia Code. The 1970 Reorganization Act amended
the Code by creating the Superior Court for the District
of Columbia and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the courts being expressly "established pursuant to
article I of the Constitution." D. C. Code § 11-101 (2).
See n. 2, supra. The Superior Court, among other things,
was vested with jurisdiction to hear criminal cases involving alleged violations of the criminal laws applicable
only to the District of Columbia, id., at § 11- 923, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals with jurisdiction to hear appeals in such cases. !d., at § 11-821. At
the same time, Congress exercised its powers under Art.
7
K endall v. United States, 12 Peters 524, 619 (1838); Matti ngly
v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687, 690 (1878); Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404, 407 (1886); Shoemak er v. United
States, 147 U. S. 282, 300 (1897); Atlanta Cleaners & Dyers v.
Unite d States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); O'Donoghue Y. United
Stat es, 289 U. S. 516, 518 (1933).
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I, § 8. cl. 9. and Art. III to redefine the jurisdiction of
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. §~ 11-301, 11-501, and
11-502. As the report of the Committee on The District of Columbia said, H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., 44:
"This title makes clear ( § 11- 101) that the District
of Columbia courts (the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals and the Superior Court of the District
of Columbia) are Article I courts, created pursuant
to Art. I, section 8, clause 17, of the United States
Constitution, and not Article III courts. The authority under which the local courts are established
has not been statutorily provided in prior law; the
Supreme Court of the United States has not declared
the local system to be either Article I or Article III
courts, decisions having indicated that the District
of Columbia courts arc, in this respect, both fish and
fmd. This expression of the intent of Congress
clarifies the status of the local courts."
It was under the judicial power conferred on the Superior Court by the 1970 Act that Palmore was convicted
for violation of § 22-3204 of the District of Columbia
Code. The conviction ':vas clearly within the authority
granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, unless, as Palmore
contends, Art. III of the Constitution requires that prosecutions for District of Columbia felonies must be presided
over by a judge having the tenure and salary protections
provided by Art. III. 8 Palmore's argument is straight8

Sections 1 and 2 of Art. III state:
"SEC'l'ION 1. The judicial Power of the United States, ~:;hall be
ye~t<·d in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Court~:; as the
Con~res:; may from time to time ordain and establi~h. The .Judge~,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their oi!iec:;
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
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forward: Art. Ill vests the "judicial Power" of the United
States in courts with judges holding office during good
behavior and whose salary cannot be diminished; the
"judicial Power" that these courts are to exercise "shall
extend to all Cases, in La\v and Equity, arising under
this Constitution. the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made. or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . . "; the District of Columbia Code, having
been enacted by Congress, is a law of the United States;
this prosecution for violation of ~ 22-3204 of the Code
is therefore a case arising under the laws of the United
States, involves an exercise of the "judicial Power" of
the United States and must therefore be tried by an Art.
III judge.
This position ultimately rests on the proposition that
an Art. III judge must preside over every proceeding in
Srrvices n Compen~at ion which ~hall not be climini~hed during i hrir
Continuance in Office.
"SECTTON 2. The judicial Power ~hall extend to all Ca~es , in Law
nne! Equit:-·, nri~ing umler this Con~titution, the Laws of the United
States, nnd Treaties mnde, or which shall be made, unclN i heir Aut horit:-· ;-to all C:1se~ nffecting Ambne~ndor~, othrr public l\finist ers
:1nd Con~ul~;-to all Ca~es of admiralt:-· nne! maritime .Tmi~dic
tion ;-to ControYer~irs to which the United Stntes ~hnll be a
Part:-· :-i o Contro1·rr~ies betwern t 11·o or more St:1trs :-brtwern a
Stair :mel Citizens of nnothrr State ;-between Citiz('J~~ of di!Terent
Stnt rs ;-bet"·rrn Citizens of the s:unr State claiming Lnnds nndet·
C:r:1nts of differrnt Statrc;, nne! between :1 State, or the Citizens
tlwrrof, :1ncl foreign State~, Citizens or Subjrct,.
"In all Cn~es affecting Ambn~~mlor~, other ]1ttblic l\Tinister~ nnd
Consuls, and those in which a State Rhall be party, the supreme
Court shall hn1·e originnl Jurisdiction. In nil the othrr CnRes before
mentioned, the supreme Court sh:1ll h:1Ye nppellnte Jurisdiction,
both ns to Law nncl Fnct , with surh Exceptions, nnd undrr surh
Rrgnlations ns the Congres~ shall make.
'·The trinl of all Crimes, except in Cnsrs of Impenchmrnt, shnll
be by .Jury: and such Trial shall br hrlcl in the State whrre the ~nid
Crimrs shall hnn' been committed: but when not commit trd within
any State, the Trial shall be at surh Pbre or PlnC('S ns the Congrrss
ma:-· by law haw directed."
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which charge, claim or defense is based on an Act of
Congress or a law made under its authority. At the
very least, it asserts that criminal offenses under the laws
passed by Congress may 110t be prosecuted except in
courts established pursuant to Art. III. In our view,
ho,,·evcr, there is no support for this view in either
the coustitutional text or in constitutional history and
practice.
Article III describes the judicial power as extending
to all cases, among others, arising under the laws of the
United States; but, aside from this Court, the power is
vested "in such inferior courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." The decision with
respect to inferior federal courts, as well as the task of
defining their jurisdiction, was left to the discretion of
Congress. That body was not constitutionally required
to create inferior Art. III courts to hear and decide ca~::es
\vithin the judicial power of the United States, including
those criminal cases arising under the laws of the United
States. Nor, if inferior federal courts were created, \Vas it
required to invest them with all the jurisdiction it "·as
authorized to bestow under Art. III. "The judicial powers of the United States ... is rexcept in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this Court l dependent
for its distribution and organization, and for the mode of
its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who
possesses the sole power of creating the tribunals [inferior
to the Supreme Court l ... and of investing them with
jurisdiction, either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and
of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degree
and character which to Congress may seem proper for the
public good." Cary v. Curtis, 12 Pet. 757, 721-722
(1838) .° Congress plainly understood this, for until 1875
"Thi.< w:l~ the Yiew of thr Coml prior 1o M ariin ". lhmta's

Lessee, l Wheat. 304 (1816).

Turner "· Ban/,; of North Amerira.

-l Dall. 8 (1799); United Slates v. lludson and Goodu•in, 7 Cranrh
32 (1812). And the contrary statcmmts in Jlunter's L!'SS('(! , Sll]!ra,.
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Congress refrained from providing the lower federal
courts with general federal question jurisdiction. Until
that time, the state courts provided the only forurn for
vindicating many important federal claims. Even then,
with exceptions, the state courts remained the sole forum
for the trial of federal cases not involving the required
jurisdictional amount, and for the most part retajned
concurrent jurisdiction of federal claims properly ·within
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
It was neither the legislative nor judicial view, therefore, that trial and decision of all federal questions were
reserved for Art. III judges. Nor, more particularly,
has the enforcernent of federal criminal law been deemed
the exclusive province of federal Art. III courts. Very
early in our history, Congress left the enforcement of
selected federal criminal laws to state courts and to
state court judges who did not enjoy the protections
prescribed for federal judges in Art. III. See Warren,
Federal Criminal Laws and State Courts, 38 IIarv. L.
Rev., 545, 551-553, 570- 572 (1925); Frankfurter and
Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court, 293 (1928);
note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal
Penal and Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial
Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966 (1947). More recently,
this Court unanimously held that Congress could constitutionally require state courts to hear and decide
Emergency Price Control Act cases involvinig the enforcement of federal penal laws; " ... that Rhode Island
has an established policy against enforcement by its
courts of statutes of other States and the United States
nt 327-339, did not sun ·ivc later cases. Sec for rxample, in addition
lo Cleary v. Curtis, quoted in tho text, Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 721-722 (1831\); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441
(1850); Case of the Sc"Wing Machine Companies, 18 WalL 55:3, 557578 (1874); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 233-234
(1922).
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which it deems penal cannot be accepted as a valid
excm:e." Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386, 391 (1947).
Although recognizing the contrary sentiments expressed
in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 615 ( 1842). and
some other cases, the sense of the Testa opinion was
that it merely reflected long-standing constitutional decision and policy represented by such cases as Claflin v.
Houseman, 93 U. S. 130 (1896), and Mondou v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
It is also true that throughout our history, Congress
has exercised its power under Art. IV "to make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States" by creating
territorial courts and manning them with judges appointed for a term of years. These courts have not been
deemed subject to the strictures of Art. III, even though
they characteristically enforced not only the civil and
criminal laws of Congress applicable throughout the
United States, but also the laws applicable only within
the boundaries of the particular territory. Speaking for
a unanimous Court in American and Ocean Ins. Co. v.
356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 546 (1828), Chief Justice Marshall held that the territorial courts of Florida,
although not Art. III courts, could hear and determine cases governed by the admiralty and maritime
law that ordinarily could be heard only by Art. III
judges. " . . . [T]he same limitation does not extend
to the territories. In legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general and of a state
government." Id., at 546. This has been the cousistent view of this Court. 10 Territorial courts, therefore,
1
° Clinton Y. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434, 447 (1871); Hornbuckle
'. Toombs, 18 Wall. 648, 655 (1874); Reyuolds Y. United States,
98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 154 (1878); The "City of Panama," 101 U.S.
45:), 460 (1880); !IIcAllister v. Unit('(/ Stales, 1-l-1 U. A. 174, 180184 (1890); United States v. McMillan, 165 U. S. 504, 510 (1897);
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have regularly tried criminal cases arising under the
gcnerallaws of Congress," as well as those brought under
territorial laws.'e
There is another context in which criminal cases arising under federal statute are tried and defendants convicted in non-Article III courts. Under its Art. I power
"to make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces," Congress has declared certain
behavior by members of the Armed Forces to be criminal
and provided for the trial of such cases by court-martial
proceedings in the military mode, not by courts ordained
and established under Art. III. Within their proper
sphere, courts-martial are constitutional instruments to
carry out congressional and executive will. Dynes v.
Hoover, 20 How. 65, 79, 82 (1858). The "exigencies
of military discipline require the existence of a special
system of military courts in which not all of the special
procedural protections deemed essential in Art. III trials
need apply. O'Callaha11 v. Parker, 395 U. S. 256, 261
(1969); 'Path v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). And
"the Constitution does not provide life tenure for those
performing judicial functions in military trials."
"The same confluence of practical considerations that
dictated the result in [American and Ocean Ins. Co. v.
356 Bales of Cotton, supra], has governed the decision
in latter cases sanctioning the creation of other courts
Roneu "· Todd. :20fi U. 8. 35S, :3GO (1907): Glidden "· Zadnok,
:370 U. S. 530, 5+4-5-+8 (19fi2).
"Srr, e. g., Baker "· Uuited Slates, 1 \Vi~. 641 (1846); United
States \'. Tom, 1 Orr. 21\ (1858): Franklin ,.. United Statrs. 1 Colo.
35 (18fi7): Pickett "· ['Jiited States. 1 Idaho 52:3 (187-l,): CnitC'd
Sta.trs ,.. Rey11old~. 1 nah 22fi (1875): Fishrr v. r'nitrd States,
1 Okla. 252 ( 1.'192).
1
~ 8C'C', e. g., Trrritor!J of Orr(/011 1' . Colc111rm. 1 OrC'. 191 (1S55);
Gile "· Peo]JIC'. 1 Colo. GO (181\7); Peo]Jlc ,.. lratcrs. 1 Tdnho 51\0
(1874); People 1'. Shafer, 1 Ut:1h 2fi0 (1875); Ex parte Larkin. 1
Okla. 53 (1891).
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·with judges of limited tenure," Glidden v. Zadnok, 370
U. 8. 530, 547 (1962), such as the Court of Private Land
Claims, United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76, 85-86 (1894);
The Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court, Stephens
v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445 (1899); Ex parte
Joinves, 191 U. S. 93 (1893); Wallace v. Adams, 204
U. S. 415 (1907); courts created in unincorporated districts outside the mainland, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S.
244, 266- 267 (1901); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298,
312-313 ( 1922), and the Consular Courts established by
concessions from foreign countries, In re Ross, 140 U. S.
45::3. 464- 465, 480 (1891).

IV
·w hatever may be true in other instances, however, it
is strongly argued that O'Donoghue v. United States, 289
U. S. 516 (1933), constrains us to hold that all of the
courts of the District of Columbia must be deemed
Art. III courts and that the judges presiding over them
must be appointed during their good behavior in accordance " ·ith the requirements of Art. III. O'Donoghue
involved the question whether the juclges of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia were constitutionally protected from having their
salaries reduced by an Act of Congress. This Court, over
three dissents and contrary to extensive prior dicta. see
Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438. 450 (1829);
Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50 ( 1884); Keller v.
Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Radio
Comm?·ssion v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930) ,
held that the two District of Columbia courts under consideration were constitutional courts exercising the judicial power of the United States and that the judges in
question were not subject to the salary reduction legislation as they would have been had they been judges of
legislative courts.
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We cannot agree that O'Donoghue governs this caEe. 13
The District of Colun1bia courts there involved. the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, had authority
only in the District, but also over all those controversies,
civil and criminal, arising under the Constitution and the
statutes of the United States and having nationwide
application. TheEe courts, as this Court noted in its
opinion were "of equal rank and po·wer with thoPe of
other inferior courts of the federal system . . . .'1
O'Donoghue, supra, at 534. Relying heavily on congressional intent, the Court considered that Congrei's,
by consistently providing the judges of these courts
with lifetime tenure, had indicated a "congreEsional practice from the beginning rwhich] recognized a complete
parallelism between the courts of the District rof Columbia l and the district and circuit courts of appeals of
the United States." !d., at 549. Moreover, these courts.
constituted as they were, and being closer to the legislative department, "exercise a more extensive jurisdiction
in cases affecting the operations of the general govern13
Wr ~hould note herr that in Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U. 8.
530 (1962), it was urged that Art. III forbadr the ns~ignnwnt of a
judge of a Court of Customs and Patent Appr!1ls to tr~' a rrimiual
ra~e Rrisina: 1mder the Distrirt of Columbia Codr. The Court of
Appeal~ ruled that rvrn if the judge in qnr~tion wnH nol nn Art. III
judge. Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, was sufficirnt authorit~· for !JiR a8~ignrnent to try cases in tlw District. The United Statrs hrrr
urged that this was true at lrast with rrspect to hws ari-.ing under
the Di~trirt of Columbin Code rather than under n law of n:1tional
npplirntion. l\1r. .Justice Ilnrl:m, for himself, nnd .Justice~ BRENNAN
nnd STEWART, found it unnerrssnry to reach this question but con~idered it an open one, for he expressly reserved "intimating [an~r]
view as to the correctness of thr holding below . . . . " !d., nt 538.
Apparently, for him, O'Donoghue had not foreclosrd the i~snr with
resprct to the trinl of the criminal case under the DiRtri<'t. of Columbia Code. Mr. Ju~lice Clark, for himself and the Chief .Justirc,
al~o thou~ht thr qurstion open. Sre 070 U. S., at n. 4, at. 580.
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mcnt and of its various departments," id., at 535, and
were the only courts within the District in which District inhabitants could exercise their "right to have their
cases arising under the Constitution heard and determined by federal courts created under, and vested with
the judicial power conferred by, Art. III." I d., at 540.
The case before us is a far cry from O'Donoghue. Here
Congress has expressly created two systems of courts in
the District. One of them, made up of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia and the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit are constitutional courts manned by Art.
III judges to which the citizens of the District must or
may resort for consideration of those conl"~.itutional and
statutory matters of general concern which so moved
the Court in O'Donoghue. The other system is made
up of strictly local courts, the Superior Court and the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. These
courts were expressly created pursuant to the plenary
Art. I power to legislate for the District of Columbia,
D. C. Code § 11-10 (2), and to exercise the "powers
of ... a state government in all cases where legislation
is possible." Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141,
147 1889).
The O'Donoghue Court had before it District of Columbia courts in which the consideration of "purely
local affairs is obviously subordinate and incidental."
O'Donoghue, supra, at 539. Here, on the other hand,
we have courts the focus of whose work is primarily
upon cases arising under the District of Columbia Code
and to other matters of strictly local concern. They
handle criminal cases only under statutes that arc applicable to the District of Columbia alone. O'Donoghue
did not concern itself with courts like these, and it is not
controlling here.
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v
It is apparent that neither this Court nor Congress
has read the Constitution as requiring every federal question arising under the federal law, or even every criminal
prosecution for violating an Act of Congress, to be
tried in an Art. III court before a judge enjoying lifetime
tenure and protection against salary reduction. Rather,
both Congress and this Court have recognized that state
courts are appropriate forums in which federal questions
and federal crimes may at times be tried; and that the
requirements of Art. III, which are applicable where
laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern arc at stake, must in proper circumstances give way
to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to
legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment.
Here, Congress established one set of courts in the District with Art. III characteristics and devoted to matters
of national concern. It also created a wholly separate
court system designed primarily to concern itself with
local law and to serve as a local court system for a large
metropolitan area.
From its own studies, Congress had concluded that
there was a crisis in the .i udicial system of the District
of Columbia, that case loads had beccome unmanageable,
and that neither those matters of national concern nor
those of strictly local cognizance were being promptly
tried and disposed of by the existing court system.''' The
' The Scnntr Committrr notrd th:lt though n~ man~· ns 12 out
of the 14 District Comt juclgr~ had brr n n~~ignrd full timr 1o the
tri:tl of thr lorn! fdon)· offrn~r~, 1lw bbrklog of criminal r:1~C's in
the Frdeml Dist ri rt Court numbrrwl 1,669 and tlw mcclinn time
lapFc from filing to final dispo~ition in felon~· tri:-ds in that ronrl
was morr than triple that in othN cli~trirt courts. Thr mc·di:m time
for ri\·il jury trinl in the District Court for the Di~t ri r·t of Columbia
1
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remedy, in part, was to relieve the regular Art. III courts,
that is, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, from the smothering responsibility for the great mass of litigation, civil
and criminal, that inevitably characterizes the court system in a major city and to confine the work of those
courts to that which, for the most part, they were designed to do, namely, the trial of cases arising under
the Constitution and the generally applicable laws of
Congress. The other part of the remedy, equally essential, was to establish an entirely new court system with
functions essentially similar to those of the local courts
found in the 50 States of the Union with responsibility
for trying and deciding those distinctive local controversies that arise under local law, including local criminal
laws having little, if any, impact beyond the local jurisdiction. S. Rep. No. 91-405, 91st Cong., 1st Scss., 2-3,
5, 18; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, at 23-24.
Furthermore. Congress. after careful consideration, determined that it preferred. and had the pmYer to utilize,
a local court system staffed by judges without lifetime
tenure. Congress made a deliberate choice to create
judgeships with terms of 15 years, D. C. Code § 11-1502,
and to subject judges in those positions to removal or
suspension by a judicial commission under certain limited
and defined circumstances. !d., at § 11-1521 et seq. It
was thought that such a system would be more workable
and efficient in administering and discharging the work
of a multifaceted metropolitan court system. SeeS. Rep.
No. 91-405, supra, at 8-11; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra,
at 35-39.
wa~ nrarly double thnt in othn di~1riet court8. Though thrre had
hrrn nn inrrr~1"e in 1hr number of felonir" committed in thr Di.·trirt of Columbin, 1hrrr IY11S a eonromitnnt decrease in the number
of fclouir:;; pro8rcuted. S. Rrp., supra. at 2-3.
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In providing for terms of office, rather than for service
during good behavior or lifetime tenure, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals noted that the Reorganization Act 'vas consistent with the situation in 46 of the 50
States, 290 A. 2d, at 578 n. 5, and the provisions of the
Act, with respect to court administration and to judicial
removal and suspension, v;·ere considered by some as a
model for the States with large, metropolitan judicial
systems.
We do not discount the importance attached to the
tenure and salary provisions of Art. III, but vve conclude
that Congress was not required to provide an Art. III
court for the trial of criminal cases arising under its
laws applicable only within the District of Columbia.
Palmore's trial i11' th-e Superior Court was authorized by
Congress' Art. I power to legislate for the District in
all cases whatsoever. Palmore was no more disadvantaged and no more entitled to an Art. III judge than
any other citizen of any of the 50 States who is tried for
a strictly local crime. Nor did his trial by a nontenured
judge deprive him of due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment any more than the trial of the citizens of the
various States for local crimes by judges without protection as to tenure deprive them of due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals is affirmed.
So ordered.

~'

,,_

Larry Hammond

\

No . 72-11 Palmore v . United States
Justice White's opinion is in accord with my views.
~

·~
(

If you have a chance to look at this before I leave for
·~ '

El Paso on Monday, let me know what you think. I do not
want you, however, to interrupt your work on the opinions
assigned to us.
I

·ii:

.~.

~:~ ~

I,

<

.hvrmu <ijourt of tqt ~nittb ~taU•
Jlht.eltington. ;ll. <!f. 20p)(.,;l
CHAMeERS 01'"

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR.

April 5, 1973

RE: No. 72-11 Palmore v. United States
Dear Byron:
I agree.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference

/

~ttttrttttt

QJottrt of tlre 'Jllttitt~ ~.tatts
:Waslpngton:. lB. QJ. 20~J~,;l

CHAM BE R S OF

JUSTICE POTTER ST E WART

April 5, 1973

No. 72-11 - Palmore v. United states
Dear Byron,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice White

Copies to the Conference

No. 72-11 Palmore v. United states

\;

t'

......

'.~

~rtmt (!fttttrt

ttf tlrt ~ttift~ ~htttg

~ngJrittghm. ~.
-'

<!f.

21l~'1;1

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

April 9, 1973

Re: No. 72-11

-

Palmore v. U.S.

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

j.Ct ·t1
Mr. Justice White

cc:

The Conference

..

·- ·~·

.. ..,..

·~

I

./
.Jlt.J1ftmt

"+ tturl ttf tlrt ~tb .Jtatt•

..ufrington. ~. <If. 2llp.Jt.~
C HAMBlRS 0,...

JUSTICE WILLIAM H

REHNQUIST

Apri l 11 , 19 73

Re:

No. 72-11 - Palmore v. United States

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your opinion for the Court.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

April 12 1 1973

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 72-11 - Palmore v. U. S.

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

t--

T.M.

Mr. Justice White
cc:

Conference
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THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

April20, 1973

Re: No. 72-11- Palmore v. U. S.

Dear Byron:
Please join me.

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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